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A Labor Arbitrator's Ability to Modify A
Termination Order Based on Employer Violations
of the Grievance Procedure
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor relations in the United States have progressed from the
physically violent confrontations of the past to today's "peaceful"
negotiation and adoption of mutually beneficial understandings. These
understandings are then embodied in the text of a collective bargaining
agreement that is signed by both management and labor. It is this
collective bargaining agreement that is the hallmark of American labor
relations.
Like any other contract, once the collective bargaining agreement
is signed, both parties are expected to uphold the principles contained
within the contractual language. However, disputes often arise after the
fact as to the interpretation to be given to specific clauses of the
agreement. These disputes are resolved through the use of grievance
procedures which are varied in form and scope. Still, some generalities
do exist, one of which is that almost all grievance procedures utilize what
is known as "step procedure." Simply put, this is a process whereby
grievances start out at a low step or level, such as the grievant's
immediate supervisor, and progress up steps in the chain of command
found within the employer's hierarchy. As a grievance moves up the
"steps," the formality of the process also increases. In the event that the
parties are unable to reach a decision mutually agreeable to all, virtually
every collective bargaining agreement provides for the use of labor
arbitration.'
A labor arbitrator's powers are limited to those provided for in
the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, an arbitrator's power can
vary greatly from situation to situation, with an arbitrator having absolute
authority in one case, but being powerless in another. This Note will
examine how far an arbitrator's interpretative powers extend.
Specifically, an arbitrator's ability to modify a termination order
based on an employer's failure to follow proper grievance procedures will
be considered. The discussion will begin by examining the general
authority possessed by arbitrators and the source of that authority.
Included will be an examination of the judiciary's power to vacate an
arbitration award. Next, the history and decision of a case recently before
1. BAsic PATTERNs IN UNION CONTRACTS, 33 (BNA 1989).
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the Supreme Court of Ohio will be introduced. 2
The Ohio case has at the center of its dispute an arbitrator's
modification of a termination order based on violations of the applicable
grievance procedure. First, the factual and procedural history of the case
will be examined to see how such a dispute can arise. Next, the case will
be closely examined in order to see the many detrimental ramifications that
arise from such a decision limiting an arbitrator's power to modify a
termination order.
II. AN ARBrIRATOR'S ABILrTY TO INTERPRET COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
A. A Labor Arbitrator's Primary Role as a Contract Interpreter Includes
the Ability to Fashion a Remedy When the Collective Bargaining
Agreement is Silent as to the Disputed Issue
Arbitration has been defined as a "simple proceeding voluntarily
chosen by parties who want a dispute determined by an impartial judge of
their own mutual selection, whose decision, based on the merits of the
case, they agree to except as final and binding. "3 Arbitration is useful
because it saves time and money, promotes the amicable resolution of
disputes and provides specialized decision making. In exchange for these
benefits, the parties to a collective bargaining agreement are willing to
accept the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement. In fact, the most
important role played by the arbitrator is that of a contract interpreter. 4
The arbitrator's guise as contract interpreter is crucial because no matter
how gifted and capable the respective contract negotiation teams are, they
cannot possibly foresee all events and actions that may occur within the
lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement.'
A labor arbitrator's role as a contract interpreter creates little
controversy when the contract language explicitly sets out the remedy to
be given as compensation for a particular violation.' When the agreement
is silent as to the remedy to be given, the arbitrator's authority to make an
2. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local 11,
611 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
3. Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 95 P.2d 49, 50 (Ariz. 1939).
4. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKS 342 (4th ed.
1985).
5. Id.
6. MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 42 (2d
ed. 1991).
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award is recognized. In the past, courts were very hesitant to allow an
arbitrator to make awards without an express grant of authority to do so.7
However, this is not the view presently recognized by most courts.
Instead, the majority of courts hold that arbitrators are free to use their
interpretive powers in fashioning remedies for those situations to which the
collective bargaining agreement does not speak." The policy reasons
behind this view were set out by Arbitrator Willard Wirtz when he stated:
The conclusion that no money arbitration award is proper
regarding contract provisions which do not specifically provide
for it would have two effects. The first would be the
substitution of some other method of settlement in the place of
arbitration. The second would be the cluttering up of the
contract with a lot of "liquidated damage" provisions which
would invite more trouble than they could ever be expected to
prevent. It will be unfortunate if the collective bargaining
agreements develop along the lines of the revenue laws, with
provisions necessarily being made for every little hair-line
question which may arise between adverse parties presenting
conflicting interests. They will lose their effectiveness when
they become so involved that laymen cannot follow or
understand them. It would contribute dangerously to that
tendency if it were required that every contract clause include a
damages provision. This is the kind of thing which it must be
assumed the parties intended would be handled in the light of
the applicability of a particular clause to the particular problems
that might arise under it.9
Thus, unless a collective bargaining agreement explicitly removes
particular subject matter and remedies from the scope of arbitration, a
labor arbitrator is free to interpret the agreement as he or she sees fit. 1
7. See generally Retail Clerks Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508 F.2d 500 (10th Cir.
1975); Leather Goods Workers Local 66 v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d 992 (8th
Cir. 1964); Refinery Employees v. Continental Oil, 268 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1959).
8. HILL & SINICROPI, supra note 6, at 45-46.
9. International Harvester Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 894 (BNA) (1947) (Wirtz, Arb.) cited in
HILL & SINICROPI, supra note 6, at 43-44.
10. HiLL & SINICROPI, supra note 6, at 47.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 9:2 1994]
B. An Arbitrator's Award Must Draw Its Essence from the
Collective Bargaining Agreement
While labor arbitrators are recognized to have broad powers of
contract interpretation, these powers are not without limits. In 1960, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases that have come to be known as
the Steelworkers Trilogy." In one of the cases, United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,' the Court made the statement that an
arbitrator's decision "is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement."' 3  This statement has been
recognized by all who practice in the field as defining the outer limits of
arbitral authority.14 Thus, an arbitrator cannot modify an unambiguous
provision of the agreement in order to dispense "his own brand of
industrial justice. "'
The limitation that an arbitrator's award must draw its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement naturally encourages parties to
demand limitations favorable to their own position in the collective
bargaining agreement.16  Of course, the opposite is also true. When
engaged in the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, a party
should use extreme care in agreeing to exclude an issue from arbitration.
This is because such restrictions absolutely preclude an arbitrator from the
consideration of the excluded issues. However, absent an express
restriction in a collective bargaining agreement, it is only in the most
extreme circumstances that a dispute will be found to be outside the
essence of the agreement, and therefore, not subject to arbitration.1 7
11. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
12. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
13. Id. at 597.
14. See generally ELKouRi & ELKouRi, supra note 4; HILL & SINICROPI, supra note 6,
at 47.
15. Detroit Coil Co. v. Machinists Lodge 82, 594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1979).
16. See, e.g., Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. International Chancel Workers, 200 F.
Supp. 521 (W.D. La. 1962).
17. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 586 (1976).
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C. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
1. Private Sector
As a general principle, once the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement have chosen a grievance procedure, the judiciary should be
hesitant to inject itself into the arbitration process.' In Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., the Court made the statement that "[i]t is the arbitrator's
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's
decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business
overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from
his."" On the same day, the Court said in United Steelworkers v.
American Manufacturing Co.:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have
agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the
arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party
seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is
governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or
wrong is for the arbitrator to decide?0
This statement must be interpreted as giving an arbitrator broad powers to
consider and remedy issues arising from a contract without fearing that a
court will later vacate the remedy because it feels differently about the
issues. Only when there is convincing proof that a labor arbitrator has
overstepped his or her authority may a court refuse to enforce an
award.'
However, courts have been able to substitute their own opinions
for those of arbitrators by finding that the award fails to draw its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement.' For example, in Detroit Coil
Co. v. Machinist Lodge 82, it was stated that the arbitrator had substituted
"his own views for the express provisions of the contract," and thus, the
court in that case denied it was reaching the underlying merits of the
dispute.2? This and similar decisions have led some to voice the opinion
18. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
19. 363 U.S. at 599 (1960).
20. 363 U.S. at 568 (1960).
21. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98
(1960).
22. ELKouRi & EucouRi, supra note 4, at 31.
23. 594 F.2d at 579 (6th Cir. 1979).
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that courts are using the "essence from the agreement" requirement as a
way to vacate arbitration awards that they feel are in error on the
merits.
2 4
2. State Courts
The uniformity of decision seen in the private sector via the
federal courts is for the most part present in the public sector as well. 5
In most states, a court's authority to review an arbitration award comes
from a statute that is similar to that found in the Uniform Arbitration
Act.' Jurisdictions generally agree that a presumption is created in favor
of an award's validity, and that the award will not be overturned absent
arbitral misconduct or an opposing public policy." Further, it appears
that at least in theory, the large majority of jurisdictions follow the
Enterprise standard of limiting judicial review to an ascertainment of
whether the award draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. 2s
A good example of how state courts review public sector
arbitration awards is found in Board of Education of Findlay City School
District v. Findlay Education Ass'n.2 In Findlay, the Supreme Court of
Ohio discussed the section of the Ohio Revised Code relating to vacating
an arbitrator's award," and the judicial restraint necessary on the part of
a reviewing court. The Court held that a reviewing court's inquiry into
whether an arbitrator exceeded his or her authority is necessarily limited
because a presumption exists in favor of the validity of an arbitrator's
award.3" In addition, the court also declared that "[o]nce it is determined
that the arbitrator's award draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement and is not unlawful, arbitrary or capricious, a reviewing court's
24. ELKoURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 31.
25. TIM BORNSTEIN & ANN GOSUNE, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION §
60.05[1] (1988) (citing Milford Employees Ass'n v. City of Milford, 427 A.2d 859 (Conn.
1980); Board of Educ. v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 427 N.E.2d 1199 (111.
1981); State v. Berthiaume, 259 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. 1977); North Syracuse Central Sch.
Dist. v. North Syracuse Educ. Ass'n, 379 N.E.2d 1193 (N.Y. 1973); Fortney v. School
Dist., 321 N.W.2d 225 (Wisc. 1982)).
26. BORNSTEIN & GOSUNE, supra note 25, § 60.05 [1].
27. Id. (citing Cape Elizabeth Sch. Bd. v. Cape Elizabeth Teachers Ass'n, 459 A.2d
166 (Me. 1983)).
28. BORNSTEIN & GOSUNE, supra note 25, § 60.05 [1].
29. 551 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio 1990).
30. OHIO RE. CODE ANN. § 2711.10(D) (Baldwin 1990).
31. Board of Educ. v. Findlay Educ. Ass'n, 551 N.E.2d 186, 190 (Ohio 1990).
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inquiry for purposes of vacating an arbitrator's award . . . is at an
end.*32 The reason being, extensive judicial review of an arbitrator's
decision would harm the bargain made by the parties, as well as
undermine the public policy in favor of the private settlement of disputes
coming from a collective bargaining agreement.Y
Ill. STATE OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING V. OHIO CIVIL
SERvIcE EMPLOYEES ASS'N LOCAL 11.34
To this point the discussion has been of a general nature, setting
out the basic principles guiding arbitrators in their deliberations and the
rules governing courts in their reviewing capacity. The focus of the Note
will now narrow to examine a case providing an excellent example of the
detrimental ramifications that result when a court improperly vacates an
arbitration award. This case is State Office of Collective Bargaining v.
Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n Local 11. 3s
A. The Factual Background and the Arbitrator's Opinion
Factually, an employee of the Ohio Department of Transportation
(hereinafter the State of Ohio) was accused of stealing road salt while on
duty.' After attending a preliminary hearing on the accusation, the
employee received a letter stating that he was being terminated from his
position with the State of Ohio? 7 Consequently, the Ohio Civil Service
Employees Association (OCSEA) grieved the termination and processed it
through to arbitration.3'
32. Id. at 186-87.
33. Id. at 189.
34. 611 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
35. Id.
36. State Dep't of Transp. v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Case No. 0037-01-06
at 4 (1989) (Smith, Arb.), rev'd sub nom. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil
Serv. Employees Ass'n Local 11, no. 90-CVH-05-864 (Franklin County Ct. of C.P., May
28, 1991), af'd, no. 90-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992),
rev'd, 611 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. at 6; see Contract Between the State of Ohio and the Ohio Civil Serv.
Employees Ass'n Local 11 [hereinafter CBA]. Section 25.01 of the CBA states:
A. A grievance is defined as any difference, complaint or
dispute between the Employer and the Union or any employee affecting
terms and/or conditions of employment regarding the application,
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In her written opinion, the arbitrator found that the employee had
in all probability taken the road salt for his own use.3 However, the
arbitrator also found that the State of Ohio had violated sections of the
collective bargaining agreement relating to the grievance procedure.'
Specifically, the arbitrator held that the State had failed to follow the
requirements set out in sections 25.06 and 25.08 of the collective
bargaining agreement concerning the production of relevant witnesses.'
meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. The grievance procedure
shall be the exclusive method of resolving grievances.
B. Grievances may be processed by the Union on behalf of
a grievant or on behalf a group of grievants or itself setting forth the
name(s) or group(s) of the grievant(s). Either party may have the
grievant (or one grievant representing a group of grievants) present at
any step of the grievance procedure and the grievant is entitled to union
representation at every step of the grievance procedure. Probationary
employees shall have access to this grievance procedure except those
who are in their initial probationary period shall not be able to grieve
disciplinary actions or removals.
39. State Dep't of Transp. v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local 11, Case No.
0037-01-06 at 14 (1989) (Smith, Arb.), rev'd sub nom. State Office of Collective Bargaining
v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local 11, no. 90-CVH-05-864 (Franklin County Ct. of
C.P., May 28, 1991), aff'd, no. 90-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434 (10 dist. Mar. 17,
1992), rev'd, 611 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
40. Id. at 17.
41. CBA, supra note 38, §§ 25.06 & 25.08. The text of these two sections reads as
follows:
§ 25.06:
The grievant(s) and/or union steward will be permitted
reasonable time off without loss of pay during their working hours to
process grievances. The steward shall be given reasonable time off
without loss of pay during his/her working hours to investigate
grievances. Witnesses whose testimony is relevant to the Union's
presentation or argument will be permitted reasonable time off without
loss of pay to attend a grievance meeting and/or respond to the Union
investigation. The steward shall not leave his/her work to investigate,
file or process grievances without first notifying and making mutual
arrangements with his/her supervisor or designee as well as the
supervisor of any unit to be visited. Such arrangements shall not be
unreasonably denied.
Upon request, the grievant and Union shall be allowed the
use of an available, appropriate room, and copier, where available, for
the purpose of copying the grievance trail while processing a grievance.
The Union shall be permitted the reasonable use of telephone facilities
for investigating or processing grievances. Any telephone tolls shall be
paid by the Union.
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Based on these findings, the arbitrator ultimately held that "discipline
[was] warranted, but the Employer's action must be modified in light of its
violation of the terms agreed to at the bargaining table. w4
B. The Opinions of the Lower Courts
1. The Decision of the Court of Common Pleas,
Franklin County, Ohio
Upon receiving the arbitrator's opinion, the State of Ohio filed a
motion to vacate the arbitrator's award.' In a two page decision, the
Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio, held that the arbitrator
had exceeded the authority given to her under section 2711.10(D) of the
Ohio Revised Code." Section 2711.10(D) reads:
In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas shall
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any
party to the arbitration if:
§ 25.08
The Union may request specific documents, books, papers or
witnesses reasonably available from the Employer and relevant to the
grievance under consideration. Such request shall not be unreasonably
denied.
The State of Ohio argued to the arbitrator that OCSEA's request was unreasonable
for cost containment reasons. However, the arbitrator found such an argument a 'weak
justification' for the failure to produce the requested witness. See State Dep't of Trans. v.
Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local 11, Case No. 0037-01-06 at 17 (1990) (Smith,
Arb.), rev'd sub nom. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees
Aa'n Local 11, no. 90-CVH-05-864 (Franklin County Ct. of C.P., May 28, 1991), affd,
no. 90-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 5534 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), rev'd, 611 N.E.2d 302
(Ohio 1993).
42. State Dep't of Transp. v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local 11, Case No.
0037-01-06 at 18 (1989) (Smith, Arb.), rev'd sub nom. State Office of Collective Bargaining
v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local 11, no. 90-CVH-05-864 (Franklin County Ct. of
C.P., May 28, 1991), aff'd, no. 90-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434 (10 dist. Mar. 17,
1992), rev'd, 611 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
43. The motion was filed pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.13 (Baldwin
1990).
44. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11, No. 90-CVH-05-864, slip op. at 2 (Franklin County Ct. of C.P., May 28, 1991), aff'd,
no. 90-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), rev'd, 611 N.E.2d
302 (Ohio 1993).
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(D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.45
The court found that this section was violated by the arbitrator's
consideration of whether the discipline given fit the violation.4  As
support for this holding, the court stated that "once the Arbitrator found
just cause for the discipline in spite of the procedural violations, she was
without authority to modify the discipline. She was vested only with the
power to decide the just cause issue."4I
2. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the
Tenth Appellate District
As might be expected, OCSEA did not agree with the decision of
the court of common pleas (hereinafter the trial court), and therefore,
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Tenth
Appellate District (hereinafter OCB v. OCSEA).4 ' While it affirmed the
trial court's decision, the court of appeals did so for different reasons than
those used previously.
The court first noted that the collective bargaining agreement in
question contained a provision stating that "[d]isciplinary measures shall
not be imposed upon an employee except for just cause. "" The court
also noted that the "[d]isciplinary measures imposed shall be reasonable
and commensurate with the offense and shall not be used solely for
punishment. "'
After a discussion of the grievance procedure found in the
collective bargaining agreement, st the court restated the question that the
parties had agreed to submit to the arbitrator:
45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10(D) (Baldwin 1990).
46. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11, No. 90-CVH-05-864, slip op. at 2 (Franklin County Ct. of C.P., May 28, 1991), affid,
no. 90-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), rev'd, 611 N.E.2d
302 (Ohio 1993).
47. Id.
48. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11, No. 91-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), rev'd, 611
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
49. Id. at *1.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *2.
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Did the Department of Transportation remove the Grievant,
[name of grievant], from his position of Equipment Operator 1
for Just Cause in accordance with Article 24 of the Agreement?
If not, what should be the remedy?2
In referring to the trial court's determination that the arbitrator
had exceeded her authority, the court stated that "[e]ven where it is alleged
that the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority, a reviewing court's
inquiry is necessarily limited by the presumed validity of the arbitrator's
award."I Using this standard, the court posited that an award may be
vacated only in those situations where the arbitrator has considered an
issue which the collective bargaining agreement exempts from
arbitration," or where the arbitrator's award draws its essence from a
source other than the collective bargaining agreement.5 '
After setting out these general principles, the court found that the
arbitrator had not considered an issue which the collective bargaining
agreement exempted from arbitration. ' In support of this finding, the
court stated that an issue submitted to arbitration will be given a broad
interpretation, thereby creating a presumption that the arbitrator has
acted within the authority granted by the collective bargaining
agreement. '  From this, the court determined that an arbitrator's
investigation into the existence of "just cause" could include an inquiry
into the procedural and substantive aspects of the grievance,"' as well as
52. Id. at *1.
53. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11, No. 91-AP-681, Ohio App. 1992 WL 55434 at *2 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), rev'd, 611
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Id.
58. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11, No. 91-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434 at *3 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), rev'd, 611
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993) (citing Champion Int'l Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union,
779 F.2d 328, 335 (6th Cir. 1985)).
59. Id.; see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Johnston
Boiler Co. v. Local Lodge No. 893, 753 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1985); Chauffeurs Local Union
No. 878 v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1980). These cases hold that the
procedural propriety of a discharge is sufficiently integral to just cause to sustain an
arbitrator's ruling on that issue.
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an inquiry into whether the discipline fit the violation. 0
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the arbitrator's
decision drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. As a
starting point, the court quoted the well known maxim that an "arbitrator
is granted considerable latitude to interpret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement . . . in order to remedy a violation of the
contract."" This rule of law was interpreted to mean that the arbitrator
had the power to review whether the sanction handed down by the State of
Ohio was reasonable, ' and as a necessary part of this review, whether
the State of Ohio had violated grievance procedures."
At this point, the court, in the remaining one page of a fifteen
page decision, abruptly held that the arbitrator's award did not draw its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement because it was punitive
in nature and not remedial." The court went on to say that its finding
meant that "[a]bsent contractual language to the contrary, an arbitrator has
no power to reinstate an otherwise properly discharged employee merely
because the employer violated a provision of the grievance procedure."'
3. The Decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio
OCSEA appealed the above referenced decision to the Supreme
Court of Ohio, who, on May 12, 1993, ruled in favor of OCSEA."6 But,
the decision given by the Court consisted of a one sentence holding stating
that the cause was reversed on the authority of Queen City Lodge No. 60
Fraternal Order of Police v. Cincinnati.6 In Queen City, the Court had
set out the broad holding that "once a violation of a collective bargaining
agreement is found, an arbitrator is presumed to possess implicit remedial
60. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11, No. 91-AP-681, Ohio App. 1992 WL 5534 at *3 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), rev'd, 611
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993) (citing Industrial Mutual Assoc., Inc. v. Amalgamated Workers
Local Union No. 383, 725 F.2d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 1984)).
61. Id. at *4.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *5.
64. Id. at *4-5. It is interesting to note that after approximately 14 pages of careful
analysis of the relevant case law, the court reached its finding on the punitive nature of the
award without citing a single case.
65. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11, No. 91-AP-681, Ohio App. 1992 WL 5534 at *5 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), revd, 611
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
66. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11,611 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
67. 588 N.E.2d 802 (Ohio 1992).
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power, unless the agreement contains restrictive language withdrawing a
particular remedy from the jurisdiction of the arbitrator."' By citing this
broad statement as the basis of its holding, the Supreme Court of Ohio
does not give due deference to the importance that procedure plays in
labor grievance disputes. Further, by not giving clear guidelines in this
area, the Supreme Court's decision gives both employers and unions the
opportunity to claim that their facts warrant special consideration in
attempting to vacate an arbitration award. Such actions severely
undermine the economic advantages presented in arbitration. Therefore,
in order to provide some guidance, this Note will next focus on the
opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals in OCB v. OCSEA, and the reasons
arbitrators must have the particular power to remedy purely procedural
violations of the grievance process.
C. The Labor Grievance Procedure Used by the Parties in OCSEA
The grievance procedure used by the State of Ohio and OCSEA is
typical of that seen in most collective bargaining agreements throughout
the country in that it uses what are known as grievance steps." A
grievance step is simply a way to resolve a grievance that has been agreed
to by the parties to the agreement. At the lower steps, the method used is
quite informal and basic. For example, in the collective bargaining
agreement between the State of Ohio and OCSEA, Step One requires the
grievant or the union or both, to orally raise the grievance with the
immediate supervisor of the grievant."' If the grievance is not settled at
Step One, Step Two requires that a written copy of the grievance be
submitted to the intermediate administrator.' However, should the
grievance continue to remain open, it passes through steps that become
more and more formal until ultimately, in Step Five, it is submitted to
arbitration.'
In addition to the grievance steps, various grievance rules exist to
protect the parties to a collective bargaining agreement. The State of Ohio
and OCSEA agreed to rules governing time requirements, discovery and
the production of information.' In fact, the issue before the Supreme
Court of Ohio arose from rules concerning the production of all relevant
68. Id. at 407.
69. ELKOURI & ELKouRi, supra note 4, at 165.
70. CBA, supra note 38, § 25.02.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See generally CBA, supra note 38, § 25.
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witnesses.7
4
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE HOLDING IN OCB v. OCSEA
At first glance, it would appear that the holding in OCB v.
OCSEA could have little effect on the practice of labor arbitration. After
all, the decision is of an Ohio appellate court and only purports to hold
that the arbitrator's award was vacated because it was punitive in nature.
However, this decision could have serious repercussions should other
courts choose to adopt a similar line of reasoning. Not only could the
benefits of arbitration be lost, but employers would have a way to "end
run" the negotiation process. In addition, the decision can be viewed as
one in which a court has substituted its sense of justice for that of the
arbitrator. Finally, the decision reduces in importance the crucial role that
grievance procedures play in the just resolution of labor disputes.
A. The Holding in OCB v. OCSEA Removes the Benefits of Grievance
Procedures
In the extremely adversarial world within which management and
labor coexist, grievance arbitration is almost unique in its unbridled
acceptance by both sides.'5 This stems from many things, not the least
of which are the services of a specialized decision maker and the savings
in time and money.76
Grievance procedures save parties time and money that would
have been expended in litigation. Every year more than ten thousand
grievances are settled in a manner that is quick and amicable.'
However, should courts choose to adopt the holding of OCB v. OCSEA,
these benefits will soon disappear because unions and employees will be
forced to rely on the courts in order to have a grievance procedure
enforced. The increase in expenses and delays that will result could be
fatal to many companies, not to mention the harm that will occur to unions
and employees. Perhaps the point is best summarized as follows:
In an arbitration, the power to award a remedy usually
accompanies the power to consider whether a bargaining
74. CBA, supra note 38, §§ 25.06, 25.08.
75. Id.
76. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 7.
77. Id. at 6.
ABILITY TO MODIFY A TERMINATION ORDER
agreement violation has occurred. If it did not, some of the
major benefits of arbitration would be undermined. If the
prevailing side in an arbitration were routinely forced to go to a
court of law (or to another arbitration) to win remedy, the time
and cost advantages of arbitration would be lost.'
Another benefit of arbitration is that in most instances, the
arbitrator is a labor specialist, and therefore, is knowledgeable as to the
conditions and inner workings of the job site. On the other hand, courts
are often unschooled in the peculiar circumstance found in a labor
setting." Because of this, some countries have gone so far as to
establish specialized labor courts within the framework of their main
judicial systems." Nor has the specialized nature of labor relations
escaped the attention of the U. S. Supreme Court. The Court, in
reference to the expertise of labor arbitrators, has stated:
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to
the courts; the considerations which help him fashion judgments
may indeed be foreign to the competence of courts.. . . The
parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will
reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the
collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the
effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence
to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will
be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objective in
using the arbitration process is primarily to further their
common goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement,
to make the agreement serve their specialized needs. The
ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience
and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance,
because he cannot be similarly informed."
However, if the holding of the Ohio appellate court in OCB v. OCSEA is
to become the general rule, the courts will be deciding whether a given
grievance procedure was followed and, thus, determining whether just
cause was found. Consequently, the expertise of labor arbitrators would
78. Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Mahoning County TMR Educ.
Ass'n, 488 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1986).
79. ELKOUIU & ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 7-8.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 7-8 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960)).
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be rendered meaningless. Such a rule takes from employers and
employees the unique benefits of arbitration.
B. It is the Arbitrator's Duty to Preserve the Terms of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement
It was stated above that in order for an arbitrator's award to be
valid, the award must draw its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement.' It is also recognized that an arbitrator's most important
duty is that of interpreting an agreement.' From these two principles
comes the realization that what an arbitrator actually does is preserve the
terms and intent of a collective bargaining agreement.
A particular arbitrator is chosen because the parties desire an
individual with some working knowledge of the conditions of employment
prevalent in the workplace.' The arbitrator is also expected to know
both the terms of the contract and the practical considerations needed to
further productivity.' The State of Ohio and OCSEA had negotiated and
agreed to a collective bargaining agreement containing a grievance
procedure for the settlement of disputes.' The parties had also agreed to
the use of a particular arbitrator.' Therefore, both parties had a right to
expect that the procedure agreed to would be followed, and that if the
arbitrator found a violation of this procedure, she would be able to remedy
that violation.'
In OCB v. OCSEA, the appellate court found that the arbitrator
did not add to, subtract from, or modify any express or unambiguous
contract language by considering the procedural error issue.r' While the
collective bargaining agreement did contain rules to be followed when
processing grievances, it did not provide for explicit remedial measures in
the event a rule was violated." However, in applying the interpretive
82. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
84. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960).
85. Id.
86. CBA, supra note 38.
87. CBA, supra note 38, § 25.04.
88. ELKouRI & ELKouRi, supra note 4, at 160 (citing Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
39 Lab. Arb. 691, 695 (BNA) (1962) (Koven, Arb.)).
89. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11, No. 91-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434, at *3 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), rev'd, 611
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
90. CBA, supra note 38, § 25.
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powers she implicitly possessed, the arbitrator held that to ignore the State
of Ohio's violations of the collective bargaining agreement would be to
excise [those] sections from the agreement, clearly beyond arbitral
authority."' In other words, if the arbitrator had not held the way that
she did, the relevant terms of the collective bargaining agreement would
have been effectively taken out of the agreement without the parties having
the opportunity to negotiate the matter. This would circumvent the entire
negotiation process that is the foundation of labor legislation,' and
prevent arbitrators from carrying out their duty to preserve the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement.
C. The Appellate Court's Holding in OCB v. OCSEA is an Example of a
Court Improperly and Erroneously Substituting Its Interpretation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement for that of an Arbitrator
1. The Court Improperly Substituted Its Interpretation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement for that of the Arbitrator
It is without question that once the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement have chosen a particular grievance procedure, courts
should be hesitant to inject themselves into the arbitration process.
Extensive judicial review of an arbitrator's decision "would defeat the
bargain made by the parties .... "" In spite of such admonishments by
the Supreme Court of its own state, the appellate court in OCB v. OCSEA
chose to substitute its decision for that of the arbitrator.
Initially, the appellate court in OCB v. OCSEA held that the
"procedural propriety" of a termination was a component of the "just
cause" required by the collective bargaining agreement." However, at a
later point in the opinion, the court held that the consideration of
procedural errors was punitive in nature, and therefore, such errors could
not justify the modification of the termination order.' That these two
91. State Dep't of Transp. v. Ohio Civil Sere. Employees Ass'n Local 11, Case No.
0037-01-06 at 18 (1989) (Smith, Arb.), rev'd sub nom. State Office of Collective Bargaining
v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local 11, no. 90-CVH-05-864 (Franklin County Ct. of
C.P., May 28, 1991), af'd, no. 90-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434 (10 dist. Mar. 17,
1992), rev'd, 611 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
92. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U..S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988).
93. Goodyear v. Local Union No. 200, 330 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ohio 1975).
94. State Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n Local
11, No. 91-AP-681, Ohio App., 1992 WL 55434, at *3 (10 dist. Mar. 17, 1992), rev'd, 611
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1993).
95. Id. at *4-5.
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statements cannot logically coexist is easily apparent. Either the
consideration of procedural errors in determining "just cause" is
appropriate, and a remedy based on such a consideration is not punitive,
or the consideration of such errors is inappropriate, and any resulting
remedy is punitive. What was already an unclear situation was
exacerbated by the court's failure to include any authority for its finding
that the award was punitive in nature." Therefore, it would appear that
instead of giving the arbitrator the deference she was due, the court was
interjecting its own opinion as to the proper outcome of the arbitration
decision.
Such judicial intervention robs the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement of the procedural protections that they have
bargained for. If a party does not want a particular issue submitted to
arbitration, he or she can attempt to inject into the agreement a restriction
limiting what issues may be arbitrated. For example, included in the
collective bargaining agreement between the State of Ohio and OCSEA
was the following provision:
Disciplinary action shall not be imposed upon an employee
except for just cause. The Employer has the burden of proof to
establish just cause for any disciplinary action. In cases
involving termination, if the arbitrator finds that there has
been an abuse of a patient of another in the care or custody
of the State of Ohio, the arbitrator does not have the
authority to modify the termination of an employee
committing such abuse.'
The language highlighted clearly precludes an arbitrator from modifying in
any way the termination order of an employee shown to have abused
patients. When a court acts as the Ohio appellate court in OCB v. OCSEA
did, such court is forcing the parties to a collective bargaining agreement
to include in the agreement restrictions on arbitration that the court thinks
are just. In the area of labor arbitration, such judicial activism could be
termed "judicial contracting," and in effect, adds the following italicized
language to the above cited passage:
Disciplinary action shall not be imposed upon an employee
except for just cause. The Employer has the burden of proof to
establish just cause for any disciplinary action. In cases
96. Id.
97. CBA, supra note 38, § 24.01 (emphasis added).
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involving termination, if the arbitrator finds that there has been
an abuse of a patient of another in the care or custody of the
State of Ohio, the arbitrator does not have the authority to
modify the termination of an employee committing such abuse.
In addition, the arbitrator has no power to reinstate an
otherwise properly discharged employee merely because the
employer violated a provision of the grievance procedure?,
Therefore, if the appellate court's decision in OCB v. OCSEA is adopted
by others, the courts will have entered into the business of modifying
collective bargaining agreements so that they comport with a court's view
of labor relations.
2. The Court Erroneously Decided that the Award Given by the
Arbitrator was Punitive in Nature
It is well settled that along with determining the substantive
aspects of a labor grievance, an arbitrator is also permitted to determine
any procedural issues that arise along the way." "Once it is determined
. .. that the parties are obliged to submit the subject matter of a dispute to
arbitration, procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear
on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator. 00
In the event of a procedural violation, three possible courses of
action are open to an arbitrator: (1) nullify the entire action; (2) nullify
the action only if the employee can show that he was prejudiced by the
violation; or (3) modify the award in some manner short of an absolute
nullification."' Of course, in deciding which of these three options to
use, the past actions of the parties should be considered. In the case of the
State of Ohio and OCSEA, on at least one previous occasion an arbitrator
had held that the State of Ohio had tainted a termination by a failure to
follow proper grievance procedures." z In that case, the arbitrator chose
to follow the third alternative listed above in modifying the termination
order. Likewise, in OCB v. OCSEA, the arbitrator chose to allow the
employee to be disciplined, but in some manner short of the termination
98. Id.
99. ELKoURI & ELuouRi, supra note 4, at 674-75.
100. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964).
101. R.W. FLEMINO, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 139 (1965).
102. State v. Ohio Civil Sere. Employees Ass'n No. G87-1494 (1988) (Pincus, Arb.).
In this case, a state employee was accused of stealing firewood he cut down and took to his
home. As in OCB v OCSEA, the State of Ohio failed to provide information pursuant to §
25.08 of the CBA. See supra note 38.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 9:2 19941
handed down by the employer. Thus, the past practice of the parties
supported the arbitrator's decision and weighed against a finding that the
award was punitive.
If one takes a literal approach, "punitive" is defined as "[r]elating
to punishment; having the character of punishment or penalty; inflicting
punishment or a penalty. " "~i "Compensation" is "[t]hat which is
necessary to restore an injured party to his former position."' Clearly,
an employer's failure to follow the proper grievance procedures can have a
detrimental affect on an employee. For instance, in the situation where an
employer fails to allow other employees to testify as witnesses on behalf of
a grievant, the grievant may be unable to put on an adequate defense. In
fact, in a discharge case such as OCB v. OCSEA, the only protection an
already terminated employee has is the grievance procedure set out in the
collective bargaining agreement.
Unfortunately, in the context of procedural violations, it is
impossible to go back in time and require the employer to give the
grievants that which they are due. When an arbitrator modifies a
termination order based on procedural violations of the employer, the
arbitrator is compensating the employee in the only way possible. In
addition, the arbitrator is compensating the union involved for the
employer's procedural violations, both present and future, by
"encouraging" the employer to comply with his obligations. Therefore,
when an arbitrator modifies a termination order due to the procedural
violations of the employer, the arbitrator is merely giving the employee
that which he or she was due under the collective bargaining agreement
and not punishing the employer.
D. The Importance of Procedural Rules
This Note is concerned with an arbitrator's ability to consider
rules of grievance procedure. Procedure is "[t]he mode of proceeding by
which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the substantive law
which gives or defines the right, and which, by means of the proceeding,
the court is to administer; the machinery as distinguished from its
product. "" The one true test of a system of procedure is to ask if it
provides just and correct outcomes.'" While this Note is concerned
with the procedural aspects of labor grievances, the concept of procedure
103. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1234 (6th. ed. 1990).
104. Id. at 283.
105. Id.
106. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (5th ed. 1989).
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is most commonly thought of as a judicial concept.'" Therefore, a brief
look at the function and importance of procedure in the civil and criminal
law setting is in order before examining the importance of procedure in the
effective resolution of labor grievances.
1. The Function and Importance of Procedural Rules in Civil
and Criminal Cases
The United States judicial system is adversarial." °  Simply put,
the adversarial system holds that the responsibility for going forward with
the various aspects of litigation rests almost exclusively on the shoulders of
the parties.' This in turn places the parties in a position of monitoring
the other side. If one views the adversarial system as a contestU the
procedural rules are nothing more than the "out of bounds" lines within
which the adversarial processes must be played out.
In civil cases, procedure serves to balance, at least to some
degree, the advantage one party has over another in terms of resources and
money." By placing limits on discovery and providing for specific
dates of filing, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are making an attempt
to place the parties on equal footing.' Another important function of
the Federal Rules is that of preserving a party's Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process rights."D To accomplish this goal, the Rules provide that
virtually every document filed with a court in relation to a particular
matter must be served "upon each of the parties."" 4  This is based on
the long established principle of United States law that "[tihe fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. "" The
notice given does not have to be the best possible, but must function to
reasonably convey the information required.1 ' However, the means that
are used must be calculated to actually inform the opposing party in order
to meet due process requirements.'1 "
107. See, e.g., id. at 1.
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., id. at 2.
111. SeeFED. R. CIv. P. 1.
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5, 26.
113. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a).
115. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
116. Mullane, 393 U.S. 306, 344.
117. Id. at 315.
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Perhaps even more important than the role procedure plays in
civil cases, is its role in the criminal system. It is certainly true that civil
cases can involve millions, and in some cases, even billions of dollars.
However, criminal cases involve something even more valuable: personal
freedom. It is for that reason that the rules of criminal procedure are
inseparably intertwined with constitutional freedoms.
For example, the Sixth Amendment provides that each defendant
in a criminal trial shall be given the benefit of the effective assistance of
counsel at all stages of the proceedings against him or her."s In fact,
the right to the assistance of counsel extends in some situations to pretrial
proceedings.'" In the event that evidence is found during a period when
a defendant is not provided with adequate counsel, that evidence is often
excluded, regardless of how conclusive it might be.'
Thus, it is seen that the civil and criminal rules of procedure
perform the function of balancing inequities in money and resources, as
well as protecting the guarantees found in the Constitution. The same
functions are seen in the context of grievance procedures.
2. The Importance of Procedure in Labor Grievances
One of the most appealing features of collective bargaining
agreements is that the parties can include those provisions that they feel
are important, and a provision contained in all labor agreements is one
setting out some type of grievance procedure." Because it is created by
private parties via a collective bargaining agreement, a grievance
procedure must be self-governing, and dependent on the good faith of the
parties. Therefore, it is not uncommon for the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement to create their own "common law" procedures for
the resolution of grievances.' These procedures are usually not found
in the collective bargaining agreement, but instead, arise as the parties
become more experienced in the arbitration process.' Some examples
are "pre-hearing submissions, order of presentation, stipulations of fact
and administrative/procedural matters affecting the hearing."'
118. Spanov. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959).
119. Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964).
120. Id.
121. See generally LEE H. HILL & CHARLES R. HOOK, JR., MANAGEMENT AT THE
BARGAINING TABLE 199 (1945).
122. BORNSTEIN & GOSLINE, supra note 25, § 1.0117][b].
123. See id.
124. Id.
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If such procedures can be considered a private form of *common
law," it is not beyond reason to consider the collective bargaining
agreement a private "constitution." Like the United States Constitution,
the purpose of the collective bargaining agreement is to protect the rights
of individuals, here employees. And, like the citizens of the United States
in the late eighteenth century, the employees do not sign their collective
bargaining agreement, but rather appoint representatives for that purpose.
However, the most important similarity between the United States
Constitution and a collective bargaining agreement is that both can be
relied upon by individuals as unchanging representations of minimum
guarantees.
One of the guarantees of the Constitution, the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, was discussed above. A good example of the guarantees
present in collective bargaining agreements is found in the agreement
between the State of Ohio and OCSEA.
The issue before the appellate court in OCB v. OCSEA concerned
the application of two provisions of the grievance procedure in the
collective bargaining agreement.1 5 The text of the two sections reads as
follows:
§ 25.06
The grievant(s) and/or union steward will be
permitted reasonable time off without loss of pay during their
working hours to process grievances. The steward shall be
given reasonable time off without loss of pay during his/her
working hours to investigate grievances. Witnesses whose
testimony is relevant to the Union's presentation or argument
will be permitted reasonable time off without loss of pay to
attend a grievance meeting and/or work to investigate, file or
process grievances without first notifying and making mutual
arrangements with his/her supervisor or designee as well as the
supervisor of any unit to be visited. Such arrangements shall
not be unreasonably denied.
Upon request, the grievant and Union shall be
allowed the use of an available, appropriate room, and copier,
where available, for the purpose of copying the grievance trail
while processing a grievance. The Union shall be permitted the
reasonable use of telephone facilities for investigating or
125. CBA, supra note 38, § 25.06.
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processing grievances. Any telephone tolls shall be paid by the
Union.
§ 2S.08
The Union may request specific documents, books,
papers or witnesses reasonably available from the Employer
and relevant to the grievance under consideration. Such
request shall not be unreasonably denied.'
It is important to note that these two sections do not exist in a vacuum, but
rather, work in conjunction with the entire grievance procedure already
described above.' Also important is the fact that the language used in
each respective section, "will" in section 25.06, and "shall" in section
25.08, indicate that the parties intended for the requirements of these
sections to be mandatory.'
If one continues with the analogy relating a collective bargaining
agreement to the Constitution, it can be said that an employee who has
been terminated from his employment has received what amounts to an
"employment death sentence.' Having received such a sentence, the
employee hopes to appeal it through the grievance procedures found in the
collective bargaining agreement. He fully expects that if he fails to meet
even one of the timeliness requirements, his grievance will be kicked
out.' On the other hand, the employee also expects that the employer
will meet whatever requirements the agreement compels. Thus, if the
employee requests the production of a document or witness crucial to his
side of the grievance, the employer must be required to produce the
requested documents.' In fact, the employee's case may turn on the
production of the requested information.
The opinion of the appellate court in OCB v. OCSEA exempts the
employer from fulfilling his duties under the collective bargaining
agreement. Continuing the analogy from above, the State of Ohio is in a
position equal to that of a police officer who violates a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights. It appears that courts such as that in OCB v. OCSEA
would find that the police officer's actions were wrong, but would then do
126. Id. § 25.08.
127. See supra notes 52-57.
128. CBA, supra note 38, §§ 25.06-25.08.
129. See generally CBA, supra note 38, art. 25.
130. It is assumed that the collective bargaining agreement provides for the production
of information..
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nothing to aid the defendant. A right does a party little good if that right
is not to be enforced, and the court's opinion strips arbitrators of the
power to enforce the necessary procedural safeguards found in collective
bargaining agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
Jurisdictions across the country must recognize that a labor
arbitrator has the authority to modify a termination based on an employers
violation of grievance procedures. To hold otherwise, strips arbitration of
the benefits it provides, prevents an arbitrator from carrying out the duty
of preserving the contract, allows a court to substitute its sense of justice
for that of an arbitrator, and fails to recognize the importance of grievance
procedures. Once the terms to a collective bargaining agreement are
negotiated and set forth in a written contract, the parties must be held to
the standards they themselves have created. If an arbitrator can not hold
the parties to these standards, the collective bargaining agreement ceases to
exist as a binding agreement between the opposing sides, and instead
becomes an unenforceable collection of randomly applied standards.
Timothy . Bricker

